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Zusammenf'assung
Eines der wichtigen Gebiete der systemanalytischen Untersuchungen im
Rahmen der Spaltstoffüberwachung ist die Quantif'izierung der über-
wachungsrelevanten Begriffe und Zusammenhinge. In der vorliegenden Ar-
beit wird ein Versuch unternommen. eine Methode zu entwickeln, die es
ermöglichen könnte, einige Kriterien zur Verringerung des maximalen
Routine-InspektionsaufWandes der lAEO in quantitizierbarer Weise zu
verwenden. Diese maximalen Auf'vände für verschiedene Kategorien von
Kernanlagen,sowie die Kriterien für die Festlesung der wirklichen
Routine-Inspektionsauf'vände für solche Anlagen sind in Artikel 80 und 81
des lAEO-Dokumentes INFClRC!153 testgelegt.
Die hier entwickelte Methode basiert auf einem mit Wichtungsfaktoren
versehenen Punktverteilungssystem. das häufig für ähnliche Entschei-
dungsprozesse angewendet wird. Einige hypothetische Beispiele zeigen
die Verwendung dieser Methode.
Abstract
- -- - - - ODe cf tne -impo-l"~ant -üpe-cts -o-r-systems -ina.rytic8J. invei~igat-ion8 in
cormeetion with saf'eguards is the quantif'ication of saf'eguards terms
and relations. In the present paper an effort·has been made to develop
a method which can be used to apply some criteria in a quantifiable
manner tor the reduction of maximum routine inspection ef'forts by the
IAEA. These maximum efforts for different categories of nuclear facili-
ties and the criteria to determine the actual routine inspection efforte
for such facilities are laid down in the articles 80 and 81 of' the Document
INFCIRC!153 published by the IAEA.
The method developed is based on a point allocation system with weightage
factores vhich i8 in common use in other decision making processes. The
use of' this method i8 illustrated with same hypothetical examples.
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'. Introduction
One of the important aspects of systems analytical investigations in connection
rith safeguards. is the quantification of safeguards terms and relations L-'_7.
In a number of areas classical scientific methods may not be applied successfully
for this purpose. Typical examples are the fixation of the enors first and secend
kind in the preparation of statements on a possible diversion. quantifiaation
of the influenceof the safeguards meuures containment and surveillance. et'ltab-
lishment of relation between the plant. national (regional) and international
safeguards systems t and so ea,
If quw:l'tification of such quanti ties becomes essential. new methode have to be
_de~elop_e_d__or_the_existing_metho_ds_mo_di:tie~~or:·.$hJLme~ho_ds_tr_o~o't~er_dis_cipline-'t_
used,
2. Criteria to be used to reduce·rotttine·inspection·efforts
A typical problem of quantifica~ion arises in connection with the application
of Article 81 of the document INFCIRC/153 L~2_/. In this article a number of
criteria have been enumerated which can be aed for the reduc16ion of maximum
routine inspection efforts by the IAEA as specified in Article 80 of the same
document. For ready reference Article 81 is quoted belo'W /-2_/.
"81. SUbjectto paragraphs 78-80 above the criteria 1:0 be used for determining
the actual number. intensity. duration. timing and mode of routine inspections
of any facility shall include:
(a) The form of nuclear material. in particular. whether the material
is in bulk form or contuned in a number of' separate i tems; i ts
chemical composition and. in the case of uranium. whether it is
of' low or high enrichment; and its accenibility;
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(b) The effectiveness cf the State's acceunting and control system,
including the extent to which the operators of facilities are
functionally independent of the State's accounting and control
system; the extent to which the measures specified in paragraph 32
above have been implemented by the State; tee promptness of' reports
submitted to the Agency; their consistency with the Agency's inde-
pendent verification; and the a.mount and accuracy of the material
unacccunbed for, as verified by the Agency;
______(QJ Characteristics of the S~atels nuclear fuel cycle, in particular,
the number and types of' facilities containing nuclear material
subject to safeguards, the characteristics cf such facilities
relevant to safeguards, nctably the degree cf containment; the
extent to which thedesign of such facilities facilitatesverifica-
tion of the flowand inventory cf nuclear material; and the extent
to which information from different material balance areas can be
correlated;
(d) International interdependence, in particular, the extent to which
nuclear material Ls. received fram ör sent to other States ror use 01"
- ---- c~--processing-;~--any_-Y-eri:rit:aj;ioD_a._~·tiv 'tJ'" by- the. Agenc;y in connection
therewith; and the extent to which the State's nuclear activities
are interrelated with those cf ether States; and
(e) Technical develcpments in the field of safeguards, including the
use of statistical techniques and randcm sempling in evaluating
.the flow of nuclear material."
In the present report a method has been discussed which could be used for the
application cf the abcve mentioned criteria in a quantifiable manner.
Forthispurpose these criteria can be divided into two main categories,
nemely:
2.1 Criteria based on the characteristics of the material handled;
a) form ofmaterial handled (81a), b) characteristics ofthe State's
nuclear fu~l cycle (81c) and c) international interdependence (81d).
2.2 Criteria based on the effectiveness of the State's accounting and
control sys~em (81b).
The criteria 81e, namely the technical development need not be considered
separately as it inherently causes a change in the verification efforts.
It is to be noted that the criteria under 2. 1 on the characteristics of
the material are universal in nature, independent of any specific type
of safeguards system.
3. Relations; Relative weightage of critel'iaa Rest verification efforts
. 3.1 Deve10pment cf a relation
Tbe criterie. based on the characterisii.cs of the material handi:ed may be
taken to be useful to assessthe non-divertibi1ity of the material. If this
non-divertibility of the material be denoted by l.I and the effectiveness of
the State's (regional) system as K, then the simplest possib1e relation
(i •e. linear) betveen the Agency verification effort denoted by A and these
two variables is given by
K+j.1A == 1 - . 2 (1)
where al1 the values of At",}A have been normalised and therefore t have
-to ~tifl the condiiion
Eqn. (1) implies that if the total verification effort ofthe IAEA verification
system (equiv. to max:imum routine inspectioneffort) beassumed to be 1,the
actual verification effort ean be ealculated by sUbtracting the sum of the
effeetiveness of the na.tional system and the non-divertibility of the material.
This sum has to be divided by 2 to fulfill the condition 0 ~ A ~ 1.
Eqn. (1) indicatesthat underthe bounda..--:; condition.1<: • 1J • 1, the IAEA reu-
tine inspeetion effort beeomes O. Sinee in that ease the IAEA eannot verifY,
the eqn. (1) has to be modified to permit a rest routine inspectioneffort y.
Besides, in this equation, both the faetors " and l.I have the same weightage.
This would mean that in the complete absence of a national system (,,=0), with
the highest value cf non-divertibi1ity tactor of l.I • 1 alone, the. aetual routine
inspeetion eftort would be redueed signifieantlY Le. by a faetor of 2.01"
50 s, In praetice the aetual inspection eftort should be influenced mainly by
the eftectiveness of aStateis system, as this im the more important of the
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two va.riables. This can be ensured by introducing a weightage factor m
between K and v.
These two requirements can be met by modif'ying eqn , (1) in the f'ollowing
manner:
1 - yA = 1 - (K+ MV)1 + m
where y =rest verif'ication ef'f'ort in case K =V = 1; (0<y<1)
m =weightage factor of' V with respect to K; (0<m<1)
(2 )
Eqn. (2) is oneof' a nume'er of' possibilities of' reducing the verif'ication
ef'f'orts by routine ins!:,ection by usingthe criteria of L-2_1, in a sem-
quantif'iable manner. It is f'airly simple, based on addition orsubtraction and
is linear in K and v.
Other relations of the following types can also be considered for the appli-
cation of the crlteria in a semquantif'iable manner:
Eqn, b ) does not appear to be suitable as in case of' either K or II being 0
the product becomes O. Eqn. a) has been ana.lysed in Annex 1. Besides the fact
that the relation is non-linear in K and II , the equation is f'airly complex
and gives (after' moditying it with respect to y and m) consistantly slightly
lower valuesof' Äthan those obtained by eqn. (2) f'or the regions considered.
Eqn, (2) has been used in this paper f'or illustration purposes.
3.2 Values of m and y
The numencal values cf' the weig."lta.ge f'a.ctor m and the rest verification
f'actor y can be assessed only vith the help of' actual examples of' f'uel cycles
as discussed later (Table 1) on in L-3_1. Same numerical examples have been
given in Annex 1 to indicate the method of estimating these values. The results
indicate that f'or the cases considered, it will be f'airly reasonable to assume
the values of both m and y to be in the range of' O. 1. Eqn. (2) cen then be
written in the f'orm
A = 1 - 0.82 K - 0.082 p
4. Quantifieation of the eriteria
The most diffieult and important aspeet of quantification in this eonneetion
is the method of assigning numerieal values to K and u , The method suggested
and diseussed below is based on adeeision matrix point alloeation system.
Similar systems are used quite orten in other fields of praetieal seience /-4_/.
4.1 The value of i.I
The three eategories of eriteria under 2.1, characterising the material handl-
ed and indicating its non-divertibility may be grouped inthe following manner-,
(a) Intern.ational interdependenee (I): This criterion, indica:ting the ertent
to which nuclear material is reeeived 01" sent to other States for storage,
use 01" processing, any Agency verification aetivities associated therewith
and the extent to which the States nuclear activities are interrelated with
those of other Sta.tes, is the most powerful index ofthe materials non-di-
vertibility. The information generated for safeguards for these materials
ean be manipulated only with difficulty by a single State.
(b) Correlation in the cycle (K): This ineludes the eriteria eharaeterising
----the-fue.1-cycle ·111 which the materf8.1ii ~na.nd1ed, nemelY, the·· numoer .arid
type of facili ties in the cycle; the degree of containment ;the ertent to
which the design of such faeilities facilitates verifieation; and the ex-
tent to which information from different material balance areas can be
correlated. For example, in a hypothetica.l cycle consisting of areprocess-
ing and a Pu-fabrication plant, in whieh Pu fram the reprocessing is sent
to the Pu-fabrieation plant, the information on plutonium produced and pro-
cessed are highly eorrelated. Besides, if a. diversion is planned, operators
of both the facilities have to cover each other. These two characteristies
increase the non-divertibility cf the plu.tonium produced in this cycle. The
weightage of these eriteria. (K) is however, lower than that for (I).
(e) Accessibility (V): This group contains eriteria charaeterising the accessi-
bility of the material handled. They include information onwhether the
material i8 in bulk form 01" eontained in separate i tems; on i ts chemica.L
composition and in the case of uranium, its enrichment. To make this set of
criteria (v) funetion in the same direction as the other tvo to indicate
the non-divertibility, the relation (1-V) has to be used. Its weightage
is also less than that of I.
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To maintain a linearity in eqn. (2), the sum 01' these characteristics may
be considered to define the non-divertibility 01' the material denoted by ~.
As mentioned earlier a point allocation system has been used to obtaina
quantifiable value. Acoording to this system, each 01' the characteristics I,
K and V are given 10 points. It was discussed above that all the three charac-
teristics do not contribute equally to this non-divertibility and therefore, can
be given different weightage factors. In our consideration, I has been given a
weight factor 01' 1, K 0.5 and (10 - V) 0.8. Eighteen possible and realistic
combinations 01' nuclear facilities in a partial or complete fuel cycle in in-
creasing complexities are listed1nTaole '--ana-tlie vaIueS<:ff I, K and (1-o-----V-;----
estimated according to the point system discussed here. The sum 01' these points
is shown in the last but one column 01' the table. Full non-divertibility (L, e ,
~ = 1) is obtained for the total number 01' points 01' 23. The u-vaäuea for the
various combinations obtained by dividing the sum by 23,ue given in the last
column. It is to be seen that the value 01' ~ reduces as the fuel cyc1e becomes
complete. This is also understandable as both I end (10 - V) tend to becoae zezo ,
A number 01' cases in Table 1 are discussed below to indicate the mode 01'
allocation.
i) Systems and 2: Only conversion plant i.n the cycle. Iii 1, source 01' U is
notknown (for example obtained from a non signatory state), in this
case I = O. K =2; although no correlation exists between different
material balance areas (es only one MBA) each category 01' facilities
has been given 2 corre1ation points vith regard to operators collabora-
tion for a diversion. For a single facility for example, the plant manage-
ment and the plant operators (2 distinct judicial bodies) have to co11a-
borate for a planned dil1ersioDo V. 0; because 01' natural concentration
and absence 01' enrichmentplant, 10 - V = 10. Total = 0 + 0.5·2 + 0.8·10 =9;
lJ= 9/23 :: 0.39. In 2, seuece 01' U knOlr-n (tor example ~om a signatory state).
I = 10; Rest same as in 1. V = 19/23 = 0.82.
ii) Systems '7. and 8: The cycle consists 01' cOliversion and tabrication pl..nts
and heavy vater type reactors (HWR). Plutonium can be stored in an un-
contro11able manner. In 7, only U-stream. considered; scurce of U knovn,
I = 5; full internationaldependence value 01' 10 points cannot be given
as an unknOWll part 01' uranium cen be used to produce Pu in the reactor.
K =2; although three different categories 01' facilities in the cycle are
present only the reactor operator knows about plutonium and could divert
it without a collaboration of the ether two facilities. V = 0 as only
natural uranium is available. In 8 the plutonium cycle is considered.
The source of U is unknown. I =0; K =2 for the same reason as in 7.
V = 10, aB plutonium is fUl1y accessible to the reactor operator.
iii) System 18: The fuel cycle consists of all the five categories of facili-
ties i.e. conversion plant, light water type reactors, tabrication, re-
processing end isotope separation facilities. Source of U is known. I =0,
ror self sufficiency. K :: 10; both isotopic correlations (fabrication, reec-
---- - --tQJ:'S-s--rePl"ocessingJ-al"e -:eully-exis'tent---&nd--8.-:f'ull--Collabo1"a..tion-O-:t'-a--numbe~--­
of facility operators is required for adiversion.V :: 10; both plutonium
and high enriched uranium are accessible and available.
It may again be noted that a linear relation has been assumed for ül
the values ef p in the range of 0 < p ~ 1.
4.2 The value cf K
A similar point allocation system has been uaed to allocate a nu:merical value to
the effectiveness K of the State system. Some of the measures vhich may be
- - considered--:tor assessing-the-effect:lvene!{s- of a,- State's--system are- Ifsted In
Article 32 cf '-2 7. Theyare reprcduced heloli' for ready reference:
!lS2. The Agreement shoul.d provide that the State' s syst~m of acccuntdng for
end control cf all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement
shall be based on a structure of material balance areas, and shall make pro-
vision es appropriate end specif'ied in the Subsidiery Arrangements for the
establishment of such measures as:
(a) A measurement system for the determination of' the quantities of nuclear
material received~ produced. shipped, lost or otherwise removed from
inventory & aud the quanti ties on inventory;
(b ) The evaluation. of precision and accuracy of' measurements and the estima-
tion of measurement uncertainty;
(c) Procedures for identif'y'ing g reviewing and evaluating diff'erences in
shipper/receiver measurements;
(d) Procedures f'or taking a. physical inventory;
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(e) Procedures for the eva.luation of accumulations of unmeasured
inventory and unmeasured losses;
(f) A system of records and reports showing, for each material balance area,
the inventory of nuclear material and the changes in that inventory
including receipts into and transfers out of the material balance area;
(g) Provisions to easure that the accounting procedures and arrangements
are being operated correctly; and
(h ) Procedures for the submission of reports to the Agency•.
It is to be noted that the measures relevant to IAEA verification, which can
be executed by the State's system d8 not limited to the 8 categories of
Article 32 /-2_1. It would have been possible to take only these 8 categories
and proceed wi th the alloca.tion system as in the case of non-divertibility (ll)
of the material. In this report a further subdivision of each of these catego-
ries has been considered as each category of!measures has different, specific
characteristics which should be considered separately in assessing the o_rall
effectiveness. Such refined and graded evaluation can malte the quantification
more representa.tive 01' the actuaJ. charäcteristics cf the StateA.s system.
Keeping this in mnd, the relevant measures by a. State' s system have been re-
- grou.:ped-below~The· numbers -and comments-in bracketsaretheassumedsubgroups
for the point system.
1. Record System: (1a: completeness of data; 1b: Clarity. ,01' presentation;
1c: ease of availability) - corresponding to 32 (r) L-2_7
2. Report system: (2a: agreement between records and reports;
2b: promptness of sUbmission) - 32 (f,h) L-2_/
3. Measurement system: (3a: accuracy of operators material balance;
3b: clarity, simplicity, tamperresistance; 3c: calibration possibilities)
- 30(a,b) L-2_1
4. Establishment 01' precedures: (4a: for physical inventory taking and
material balance; 4b: for MlJli' including SiR ~difference) ~ 32 (c,d,e) /-2_7
5. Containment and surveillance measures: (5a: features of the plant;
5b: additional measures which may be considered by the State' s system)
6. Inspection by the State's system: (6&: observation or independent
analysis of throughput and inventory measurements; 6b: Execution 01'
containment and surveillance measures; 6c: verification 01' consistency
of reports and records; 6d: analysis of MUF; 6e: calibration of instruments)
- 32 (b,d,e,g) T2/
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AB in the case of the evalua.tion of 11. each of the groups has been allocated
10 points. but they need not have the same weightage for the estimation of the
effectiveness. The records (1). measurement system (3) and the inspections (6)
may be taken to have -ahe same weightage as they are used to register. generate .
and verify the primary information for safeguards. The reporting system (2) can
be given a slightly lover weightage as i t is used mainly for corroboration of
data and for planning of inspections. This is followed by containment and sur-
veillance measures (5) as they do not lead to a.ny quantifiable conclusion. The
lowest weightage is given to the establishment of procedures (4 ). The actual
weign-fage factors usea--ror-~ne~<ll:r:r-erentr-IYo-ints-are~:-------~----------
Points Weightage factor
1.3.6 1
2 0.8
5 0.5
4 0.2
In Table 2 fifteen cases cf State's systems have been considered and the sum
of the points for each system estimated. The value of K for these systems is given
in the last column.
4.2.1 Comments on groups and subsroups
Some comments on thedifferent groups and subgroups listed in Table 2. are re-
quired to explain the basic philosophy underlying the alloca;tion sys tem,
a ) On the different groups :
L) The record t report snd measurement systems (groups1,2.3) are
essential in the framework of NPT-saf'eguards. They must form the
basic components of' the State' s system to enable the Agency to
verif'".r. They cannct; have therefcre t zero points in sny States
system.
ii) The group on pzocedures (4) has been given a very low weightage
as it can be prepared by any State fairly easily (particularly
because i twill be similar for si.mila.r categories of plants and
measureJll.ent methods). It has 2 points in a total of 45. Therefore,
no gradual variation is madebut either 0 01" 2 points have been
allocated to this group.
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iii) Although containment and surveillance measures have not been
included in Article 32 L-2_7. they have been taken up under
group 5 in this paper. It has been shown elsewhere L 3,5_1 that
particularly these two measures can contribute significantly to
the effectiveness of a safeguards system. However, it must be clear-
ly stated that these measUres have nothing to do with the physical
protection measures. Physical protection measures are not a sUbject
matter of Safeguards Agreement between the lAEA and aState.
and therefore, cannot be considel"ed by the IAEA in evaluating the
effectiveness of aState' s system in the framework of such an agree-
--~ment-.-The-Wes--of'-J"ac-toJ."S-whi-ch~jLConside~ed_~der_t-his~~o_up _
are for example, the features of nuclear facilities (glove-boxes in a
Pu-fabrication plant, Pu-birdcages, reactor vessels etc •• i .e , those
inherent featurs of aplant which ma;y be used as complementary measures
to material balance for ensuring the correctness (j'f the data) and the
measures which the State' s system ma;y take on the basis of available
conditions in aplant (for example sealing).
iv.} Two types of inspections are carried out·by the State's system:
They are (a) those which are not carried out by the Agency inspectors
e.g. ensuring that records are kept; preparation and dispatehing of
-reports; -tes-ting- of'measurement.·sy.stem·of' ·the·· operatoX'.- at the beginn-..
ing and in the event of a change , and (b ) those which a:recarried
out by the Agency inspectors also and are listed under group 6.
Only these points are considered for effectiveness. as the activities
under a) are not directly verifiable by the Agency.
v) A number of factors in a State's system is in practice in the damain
of the facility operator. They a.re tb , c (1a being essential and therefore
not variable), 3a,b,c and 5a. The rest of the factol"s has been considered
to be under the responsibility of the State's system. In allocating
points to diffel"ent varie:tions of aState' s system. a. differentiation
has therefore, been made between the operator's and the State's system.
b ) On the different subgroups
i) The subgroup 1a , completeness of data in a. record sy-stem is a baa i c
prerequisit of Agency verification. Therefore, it is given 5 points
i.e. 50 %of the weightage inthis gl"Oup. It is further assumed that
in all the possible variations of a State's system, it must be ~vailable
fully i.e. all the 5 points will have to be given.
-13-
ii) For the subgroup 50 t L, e , a.dditional containment end aurveillance
measures by the State's system, the number of points cen either
oe 5 or 0, as no gradual quantification of these measures is
possible.
4.2.2 Comments on the different ßtate'ssystems
Starting with the three basic groups 1,2,3 for a State's system, other groups
a.re gradually introduced into thesystem to make it complete. The variations
presented in Table 2 do not correspond to any existing system and are not ne-
cessarily complete. The basic characteristics of the15systems are indicated
below:
System I: 1,2,3 fully complete; rest absenf
11: 1,2,3; rest absent; State's system: good; operator's system:
Measurement system good , recording system poor
111: 1,2,3; rest absent; good State's system; poor operator's system
IV: 1,2,3; rest absent; poor Sta.te's sy.stem; poor operator's system
V: 1,2,3; rest absent; both tbe Sta.te's end the operator's system poor
VI: System 1+ 5; rest abaent ; I + full containment
------ ------------- --------- ----- ---
VII: I + 1/2 containment; rest absent
VIII: V + full containment; rest absent
IX: V + 1/2 containment; rest absent
X: Fully effective State's safeguards system
XI: X + 1/2 containment
XII: State's system: All measures are good (1-a,28.,b; 48,,0; 50; 6a,0,c,d,e);
Operatorts systeJll.: All measures are poor (lb,c; 3a,0,c; 5a)
XIII: States system: Äll measuresare pOOl'; Operator's system:
All measures are good
XIV: State's system: All measures are good;
Operator's system: Recordsare good; measurement and containment
system arepoor
XII: State's system: Reporting and procedures are poor; containment end
inspections are good. Operator's system: All measures are good.
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5. Comments on guantification results
5.1 Non-divertibility factor B
An analysis of the non-divertibility factor u in Table 1 reveals a number of
points. They are commented below. It is to be noted that the eomments are
limited only to the cases considered in this report.
a) For those variations of a State's system which assume an unkno'W'n
uranium souree (systems 1t4t6t8t 13) the l.l valuesare extremely low and
practically do not contribute to a reduction in the verification efforts
of the IAEA by routine inspections. In realitYt such systems are highly
improbable and therefore t have not been considered any further.
b) The l.l values for uranium cycles are fairly high and vary in the range of
0.5-0.9 excepting in the case of 17 (a self-eontaining fuel cyele including
an enriehment faeility). In this case the non-divertibility reduces to
0.22 and becomes equivalent to Pu-cyeles. This appeazs to be fairly reason-
able.
c ) The l.l values for Pu-cycles are consist ntly low and vary in the range of
0.2-0.3 and almost independent of the complexity or completeness of
---- ----the--c~cle-.--This-fic·Lapp_ears--t~(Lb-e-c-Qnsist.nt with the actual eonditions
whieh may exist in reality.
5.2 Effectiveness of a State's system
The effectiveness (I<:) values of the different variations of a State's system
considered in this report t also indicate same trends. It should be mentioned
once more that none of the variations refer to any existing State' s system.
a ) K values vary between 0.2-0.94 (system V and IX respeetively). For the
lowest vaäue , both the State's and the operator's system have been assumed
to be insufficient besides the fact,that the State' ssystem does not have
any inspection activities. In the case of the highest activities only the
contairJment of the plant haR been assumed to be insufficient. In practice,
the effectiveness value of a particular State's system is expected to
remain below . the maximum value given in Table 2.
b) Sinee 5 points under the group for reeords and 3 points under the group
of measurements are kept constant (basic requirement for verification),
the K value cannot go below 0.18. A rest value for Kappears to be ju..'3ti-
fiable as any State, ratif'ying the NPT, will have the obligation to set
up an accounting and control system.
c) The group for inspection activities has the maximum possibilities of
variations. This has been done partieularly in view of the fact that
this group influenees the IAEA verification efforts in a most direct
manner.
6. Implications
6.1 Reduced verification efforts
The maximum routine inspection etforts tor different eategories cf faeilities
as laid down in Artiele 80 L~2_7 can be interpreted to ensure a full coverage
by an inspection regime in establishing . material balanees for different mate-
rial balance areas, in a timely manner. The uncertainty in such a material ba-
Lance will be ceused only by the standard deviations in measuzemenbs , This 00-
. u certain.1~ iSm~.Jlleasure 9f the capability of an inspection regime with full co-
verage. This uncertainty leads to a minimum divertible ..~ threshold amount whieh
can be detected by the inspeetion regime girlng the full coverage, with a given
probability.
In the case of a reduetion in the IAEA verification effort ror the same material
balance areas, the IAEA inspectors alone cannot give a full coverage in estab-
lishing the material bs.lanees. However, it is to be taken that a fUll ccverage
will be given in any case by the State's system. Therefore, although IAEA gives
a lower cove:z:age, the joint coverage by the IAEA and the State' s system gives
rise to the sa.üeminimum. divertible threshOldS amounts for the material bala.."1ces
8.S in thecase of a full coverage ,
Withreduced Agency verification efforts, the threshold values of diverted
amounts above whieh the IAEA alone eould detect a diversion with the same pro-
bability of detection, would inerease. However t sinee these values remain at the
minimum divertible amounts for the sum of the inspection regime, the increased
threshold values of IAEA alone, are a measure of the credibility attributed by
the IAEA to the State's system giving the full eoverage. Theretore, the increased
divertible amounts assoeiated with the reduced verification efforts of the IAEA,
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may be regarded as 11credible amounts" ccrresponding tc a. given State' s system.
6.2 Numerical values cf A
Some values of the reduced IAEA verification efforts A for different values
or u and K fram Tables :l and 2 are given below• They are obtained by introduc-
iog the II and K values in eqn. 3, which means that fer these concentrations,
the values of y and m have been kept at 0.1.
1-1 K
0.82 0.81
0.82 0.21
0.52 0.81
0.52 0.21
0.22 0.81
0.22 0.21
0.26
0.76
0.29
0.79
0.31
0.81
It is to be noted that the IAEA verification effort A varies in the range of
0.26 t.o o. 81 depending on the values cf K and J,I. Fer the aame K value cf 0.81
an increase in the II value from 0.22 tc 0.81 reduces the A fram 0.31 to 0.26
only. The Ä is much more sensitive to the K values.
6.3 Credible amounts
The credible amounts for a given IAEA verification effort A, can be calculated
only for a specific fuel cycle. The procedure for estimating these credible
amounts is fairly complicated.
Six steps are required for this estimation. They are indicated below:
Step I:
Step Ir:
Step III:
Step IV;
Step V:
Step VI:
Laying down cf base fuel cycle data including possible divertible
amount/safeguarded unit in the case of reduced verification eff"'orts
Fixing data for all safeguards measuresfor full coverage
of the.fuel cycle by the State system
Estimation of uncertainties inthe material balance through
full coverage, caused by measurement errors alone
Estimation ofreduced verification efforts by the application
of criteria
Distribution of reduced verification efforts in different
nuclear facilities in the cycle
Estimation of credible amounts in material balance for
the reduced IAEA verification efforts
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7. Conclusions
The criteria laid down in Article 81 of the IARA Document INFCIRC/153 /-2_/
can be applied in a rational manner to reduce the maxiraum IAEA routine inspec-
tion efforts, only if a method is available to quantify these criteria. The
'Work in the present report Ls an effort in this direction. In spite of the pre-
liminary nature of the study and the limitations imposed by the types of systems
considered, a number of generalized conclusions may be made.
7.1 A method based on decision matrix point allocation system has been used to
quantify theabove mentioned criteria. It should be mentioned that a point
allocatiori system is not fully objective. Subjectiv.e moments entcr into the
picture by the estimation of weightage factors, allocation of points, and by
the fixation of the number of groups and subgroupa , These moments can be mini-
mized by making different independent groups of persons to allocate points for
the sa.mesystem.
7.2 Fairly simple linear relations can be used to forma.lize the relation bet-
ween the components relevant to verification and the reduced verification efforts.
In the present study f'our components have been used to develop the relation.
They are the rest verif'ication effort y, weightage factor m (between K and u )
--ana'tne~vocri~eria-non";-a:lvenioilityof' materiar-li- and the-eiffectiveness<>f---
the State t s system K. FOT the lindted number of ceaes considered and the tuel
cycle analysed, the values of y and m.:were found to be in the neighbourhood
of 0.1 and both the values of K and 1..1 were found to vary in the range of 0.2 to
0.8. Because of reduced influence of m, the IARA verification effort A was found
to be mainly influenced by the K and varied between 0.26-0.81.
7.3 The main implication of a reduced IAEAverification effort is an increased
threshold divertible &mount in the establishment 01' material balances by the
lAEA alone. These increased threshoJ.d" divertible a!nou.."lts can be considered to
be a measure of the credibility which the lAEA system can allocate to the State's
system. These amounts can therefore be considered as credible &mounts for the
systelD. for which the reduced IARA verification efforts have been asaumed, These
credible &mounts can be estimated provided adequate information on the fuel
cycle and on safeguards measures are available.
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Table 1: Characteri.stics er fissi.le material influencing i ts non-aivertibility (lJ)
(In the CElLSe of two numben for the same cycie. 1 is for U and 2 for Pu.)
Excepting system 1.2 I
I
~ I I K 10-VSys4l Conv. Re~Lctor Fabr. Hepr. EInrich. (06I'1~ (O'tK~10) (O~lO-V~lO ) .1 0.5 K 0.8( 10-V) l: u
0
x+
10 10 10 10 5 8 23 1
1 0 2 10 0 1 8 9 0.39
2 X 10 2. 10 10 1 8 19 0.82
3 X+ (HWR) 5 2 10 5 1 8 14 0.61
4 X 0 2 ' 0 0 1 0 1 0.043
5 X (LWR) 10 I 2 0 10 1 0 11 0.48
i
6 x+ X o I 4 0 2 0 2 2 0.086
i
7 X' 5 I 10 5 1 8 14 0.61
8 x+ X (HWR) X o I 2 0 0 1 0 1 0.043
I
-9 X X (LWR) X 10 6 10 10 3 8 21 0.9110 5 2 0 5 1 0 6 0.26
11 X X (LWR) X X 10 4 5 10 2 4 16 0.69
12 5 2 0 I) 1 0 6 0.26
13 x+ X (LWR) X X 0 4 '0 0 2 0 2 0.086
14 5 2 0 5 1 0 6 0.26
-8 - 8i15 X X (LWR) X X 10 10 10 4 12 0.52
16 2 8 0 2 4 0 6 0.26
17 X XdLWR) X X X g I 10 0 0 5 0 5 0.2218 10 0 0 5 0 5 0.22
I
+ • I I = InternatiDnal intelX SupplJ.ed or recovered &mounts of U not knovn, I dependence
I
X Supplied or recovered &mounts of U known independentlt. K =Correlation in the cycleV =Accessibility of mi terial
I V =Non-divertibility
I
I
I
I
I
I
....
Cf
I
,
,
I
I
I
Table 2: Characteristics of states systems influercing their effectiveness (K)
i
.~ 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 %=
System 180 1b tc 2a 2b 3a 3b 3c 4a 4'b 58. 5b 6a 6b 6c 6d 6~ 1" (1) 0,,8" (2) 1"(3) 0,,2"(4) 0.5·(5) 1 e (6) I: K·100
,
0 5 3 2 5 5 4 3 3 6 4 5 5 4 1 1 2 21 10 8 10 2 5 10 45 100
I 5 3 2 5 5 4 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 10 8 10 0 0 0 28 62.2
II 5 0 0 5 5 4 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 5 8 10 0 0 0 23 51
'i
,
I
!II 5 0 0 5 5 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 5 8 3 0 0 0 16 35.6
,
IV 5 3 2 1 1 4 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 o ,0 01 10 1.6 10 0 0 0 21.6 48
V 5 o 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 I 5 1.6 3 0 0 0 9.6 21.4
°i
VI 5 3 2 5 5 4 3 3 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 I 10 8 10 .0 5 0 33 73.4O. 0,
VII 5 3 .2 5 5 4 3 3 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 o 9 10 8 10 0 2.5 0' 30.5 67.8
VIII 5 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 i 5 1.6 3 0 5 0 14.6 32.59
IX 5 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 d 5 1.6 3 0 2.5 0 12.1 26.8i
X 5 3 2 5 5 4 3 3 6 4 5 5 4 1 1 2 ~ 10 8 10 2 5 10 45 100
XI 5 3 2 5 5 4 3 3 6 4 0 5 4 1 1 2 ~ 10 8 10 2 2.5 10 42.5 94.4
-
1
EI! 5 0 0 5 5 1 1 1 6 4 0 5 4 1 1 2 I 5 8 3, 2 2.5 10 30.5 67.8~
,
iXIII 5 3 2 1 1 4 3 3 0 0 5 0 1 0 1 0 1 10 1.6 10 0 2.5 3 27.1 60.21,
I
-
XIV 5 3 2 5 5 1 t 1 6 ~; 0 5 4 1 1 2 d 10 8 3 2 2.5 10 35.5 79,
I
I
...
XV 5 3 2 1 1 4 3 3 0 0 5 5 4 1 1 2 4 10 1.6 10 0 5 10 36.6 81.2
-
I
-"
'\0
I
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Annex 1
SupplementaryInformation ontheQ1iantitication of Cl"itel"ia
1.1 ConsiderationofotherPossibilities fortheQuantirication
of Criteria.Num.ericalExemPle
In chapter 3 the following relation for the reduction of the verification
efforts with the help 01' the cri'beria given in ('7'2_/ had been "suggested
-------------*A~=-1--- 1=y (K+JI1ll--t)---------{-+..-+-t-----~--­1+m
Here. K i6 the effectivity of the national (regional) system. ~ the non-
./
divertibility of the material. m the relative weightage 01' effectivity and
non-divertibility and y the rest verification effort in the case K9J=1. The
main eharacteristics of formula (1.1) is its simplicity: It is linear in K
and \.I.
An alternative formula can be given by starting with the expression
(1.~J
Introduction of the relative weightage m leads to
>:1 = (1-K)( l-mlA)
1'01" 0 , m ~ 1
If furthermore the rest verification effort y is introduced. it leads to
the following alternative formula
(1 .4)
Compared to fomula (1.1)it can be seen. that it is more complicated with
respectto K and )J. and is not linear in K and )J. An advantage er fomula
(1.4) might be that it contains no denominator as it is the ease in fomula (1.1).
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For the case
y = m = o. 1; K = 0.81; 1.1 = 0.22
(vhich appears to be representative for a large number of cases)
'l;he values of A obtained vith the two different formulas (1. 1) and (1.4),
do not differ very much , To test this, deviations of the K and 1.1 values ,
as shown in Fig. 1.1 have been considered.
1.1
0.26
0.22
0.18
-------0-- ----0
I 1
- - -- -----0
, I
I I I
------t- -~--i
: I I
0.7 0.81 0.9
Fig. 1. 1
The following results are obtained for the different values chosen:
(1) K = 0.81 l.l = 0.22
A = 0.32 A1 = 0.27
(2) K = 0.7 1.1 = 0.26
A =0.41 A1 =0.36
( 3) K =0.7 lJ =0.18
A =0.41 A1 =0.37
(4) K = 0.9 lJ = 0.26
A = 0.24 A1 = 0.19
(5) K = 0.9 1.1 =0.18
A ;: 0.25 A1 = 0.19
It is evideJit.that in the vicinity of the point (0.81, 0.22) in the
(K ,1.1 )-plane, the values ot A obtained by the tvo different formulas are
not very different.
-23-
1.2 Estimation of the -NumericalVa.lues of mand y
The numerical values of m and y can be estimated only with the help of
special numerical examples.
(a) Numerical value of the relative weightage m of effectivity and non-
divertibility.
This value can be fixed with the help of the fuel cycle examples given in
table 1. The partial fuel cycle No. 2 consisting of only one conversion
plant may be consi-dered. As-shown in 1''':'"3_7 8; fuH-c-o-verage f-o-r-this f'acility
means independent verification of 60 analyses per year. The maximum number
of inspection man days is given according to L-2_/ to be
100 + 0.4 ,. 94 = 140 Insp.man days/year
as the throughput per year in this plant is 940 t nato U =94 eff. kg of U
and this &mount is greater than the inventory of the plant.
The non-divertibility factor of this plant iso \.l =0.82.
This is one of the two highest values cf \.l for the fuel cycles considered
- _..-
here. These values of non-divertibilities coupled with a fully effective
State's system (K=1) ahould theefore, require the minimum possible (not
zezo ) verification effort A. (The rest verification effort y does not come
into the picture as yet.) For the cases considered here the minimum verifi-
eation effort m,e.y be taken to be the veritication of one analysis per year
01" verification of 1%of the total number of analyses per year, whichever
value is the more reasonable.
For the conversion plant consideredhere, 60 analyses are to be verified
per year for full coverage t for which 140 insp. man days are available.
Assuming that virtually the whole of these man days will be required for
the verification of the different steps involved in the analyses, it ean
be argued that 140/60~3 man days will be required per analysis.
The minimum verificationeffort in this case is the verification of one
analysis per year. (1% is less than one analysis hence not reasonable.)
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Expressed as the fraction of time
Amin = 1'0 =0.021
Therefore t according to formula (1. 1) t with
y =0; K = 1; ~ =0.82.
a value of
is obtained.
(1.6 )
Another example is thefuel cycle No.',:9intable 1. This consists of one
conversion plant. light water reactors and one fabrication plant for low
enriched uranium, andhas the highest non-divertibility factor of ~ = 0.91.
Since these non-divertibility factors can be considered facility vise (tke'
maximum routine inspection efforts are calculated per ,facility ), i t is j usti-
fiable to consider the case of the fabrication plant alone. Here a single
analysis per year would not give any reasonable, verification as feed and pro-
duct streams have to be verified individually and the number of i terns to be
measured in each of these streams are very high. Hence verification of 1 %
of' the total number er analyses has been ta.'Iten to be the minimum effort re-
quired. Therefore
A =0.01; and with K • 1; ~ =0.91
according to (1.1)
m • 0.12
Having these two estimations of m in mind a value of
m = 0.10
(1.8 )
has been proposed for usa in equ. (1.1). ~n important consequence cf this
relatively low value er m is that the influence of the non-divertibility of the
material on the actual verification efforts has been reduced considerably.
so that, the actual verification efforts are governed mainly by the effective-
ness of the States (regional) safeguards system.
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(b) Numerical value of the rest verification effort y in case of' K = ~ = 1.
It is assumed that the rest verification effort y in case of K = ~ = is
given by the game theoretical value, that muns bythat value which induces
the operator to act legally {-3_/. In this connection it is assumed that the
gain of the operator in case of successful diversion is smaller than the loss
of the operator in case of adetected diversion. The following numerical
results were obtained in Ref. {-3_1:
y =0.02
y = 0.004 (input) 1)1
y = 0.0001 (oubput ) .)
------+Conversion plant---±f----------------'f---C---G.e;2-------~---------'
(natural U)
Fabrication plant
(3% enriched U)
Reprocessing plant
Isotope separation plant
y = 0.08
y = Oe03
y =0.099
y =: 0.006
y =0.067
(input)
(U outiput )
(Pu output)
(input) 1 )
(oucput ) 1 )
It canbe seen that two graups of y-values are obtained: One group vith
y-values between 7 aJid 10% and one group with y-values below 2%. As in the
first giloup the Pu-verification is contained and this seems to be the more
imporSant of the two, a rest verification effort of
y =0.1
has been assumed for all types of fuel cycles, to be on the safe aide.
1)These values differ from those given in Ret. {-3_/, as there a different
definition for ef'fective kg in the case of uranium vith an enrichment of
3% and 1% has been used.

